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GOVERNING NETWORKS: 
TELECOMMUNICATION 





In the Summer of 2001, while visiting the United States, a 
Ukrainian official in charge of telecommunication regulations 
raised his voice. Clearly, he said, not telecom competition but 
coordination is what his country needed. Two months earlier, a 
U.S. telecom policy maker exasperatedly remarked at an inter-
national conference, “This is the problem with you Europeans. 
You don’t believe in competition. You’d rather have state-
imposed coordination.”1 
These statements may be simplistic, but they exemplify two 
quintessential positions in telecom regulation (and regulations 
in general): competition and coordination. Much of the history 
of telecommunications infrastructure is one of state ownership 
and heavily regulated private monopolies. But over the last 
fifteen years we have witnessed a widespread liberalization, 
especially in the U.S. and the European Union (“EU”), acceler-
ating rapidly over the past five years.2 Today, the telecommu-
nication markets are highly competitive on both sides of the 
Atlantic. In many European countries, for example, rates for 
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 1. Interview with unnamed United States official, in Zurich, Switzerland 
(June 28, 2001). 
 2. See Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Mathias Strasser, A Closer Look at 
Telecom Deregulation: The European Advantage, 12 HARV. J. LAW & TECH. 
561, 562 n.2 (1999). 
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long distance phone services have come down a staggering 80% 
or more from what they used to be only a decade ago.3  
On the surface, both the U.S. — through its Telecommunica-
tions Act of 19964 — and the EU — through its telecommunica-
tion directives5 — have approached liberalization fairly simi-
larly, substituting a monopoly with a market in which new en-
trants may successfully challenge the incumbents with the help 
of a complex competition-inducing regulatory framework. On a 
closer look, however, one discovers substantial differences in 
how the two tackled the regulatory task. 
Comparing the successes and failures of the two regulatory 
frameworks may reveal important insights on how to better 
legislate in the future, in other countries, and perhaps, even in 
other sectors yet to be deregulated. But the authors think that 
it is still too early to comprehensively assess the two regulatory 
frameworks. Only a few years have passed since these frame-
works have been put in place, and the long-term impacts may 
not yet be visible. Moreover, accurate economic and quantita-
tive comparative studies are still scarce. The central hurdle, 
however, is the lack of an adequate and objective benchmark-
ing framework. What are we supposed to compare when evalu-
ating different regulatory regimes? How do we measure suc-
cess?  
To better understand the existing legal  frameworks and to 
aid future law makers, the authors propose a first building 
block for such a benchmark: an evaluative model based on po-
litical economy theories of policy interdependence.  This model 
provides an assessment of the challenges that a system of ju-
risdictions faces and of the capacity of a particular legal 
framework for deregulation to meet those challenges.  
The authors will discuss three types of regulatory interde-
pendence:  competitive, coordinative and informational. An ef-
fective governance model, the authors argue, needs to be re-
sponsive to the types of interdependencies that exist in a par-
  
 3. This decline is not limited to end-user call charges.  For example, 
charges for leased telecommunication lines have come down by 30% within 
two years (1997-99).  See Sixth Report on the Implementation of the Tele-
communications Regulatory Package, COM(00)814 final at 3. 
 4. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 5. See infra notes 15-22. 
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ticular policy area.  As components of each of these interde-
pendencies are present in the telecommunications sector, a hy-
brid governance model is required.  The title of this Article 
therefore has a dual meaning: on one level, it is about tele-
communication networks; on another level, it is about govern-
ance networks.  The authors find that the EU model in telecom 
has a number of distinct advantages:  (1) it has centralized a 
core set of standards that address interface concerns;  (2) it 
spurs innovations through what is an otherwise decentralized 
system; and (3) it has created an effective informational net-
work through which those innovations might spread. 
Part II of this Article reviews the current legal framework of 
liberalized telecom markets. Part III introduces the competi-
tive, coordinative and informational modes of regulatory inter-
dependence and shows that all three of them are present in 
various forms in the existing legal frameworks. In Part IV, the 
Article suggests that the key to understanding these frame-
works is to accept that the regulatory structure should not be 
optimized to address just one of the three types of 
interdependencies.  
II. THE EUROPEAN TELECOM REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
In Europe, since its inception, telecommunication was ad-
ministered as a public utility by government owned and oper-
ated national carriers. They controlled long-distance and local 
services as well as terminal equipment.6  In the early 1980’s, 
spurred by the developments in the U.S. and fueled by Marga-
ret Thatcher’s policies of deregulation, the United Kingdom 
took the lead in European telecom liberalization. The door for a 
European deregulatory movement was opened in 1985, when 
the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) decided that competition 
rules applied to the telecommunication sector.7 In 1987, the 
European Commission (“Commission”) published its blue print 
for pan-European liberalization.8  This 1987 Green Paper envi-
  
 6. See REGULATION OF NETWORK UTILITIES:  THE EUROPEAN EXPERIENCE  1  
(Claude Henry et al. eds., 2001). 
 7. See Case 41/83, Italian Republic v. Commission, 1985 E.C.R. 873 
(1985).   
 8. See generally Towards a Dynamic European Economy, Green Paper on 
the Development of the Common Market for Telecommunications Services 
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sioned a comprehensive regulatory framework leading towards 
progressive liberalization.9 It also defined harmonized access 
conditions to networks, which later were turned into the Open 
Network Provision (“ONP”) concept.10  
The liberalization advanced along two distinct tracks: 
Commission directives based on competition law, and the 
Council of the European Union (“Council”) directives based on 
the ONP concept of set access conditions.11 While competition 
law is based on Article 82 of the Treaty Establishing the 
European Community (“EC Treaty”)12 and its general notion of 
antitrust, the ONP concept is based on national regulatory 
frameworks enforced by national regulatory authorities.13 
Based on the detailed ONP concept mandated by the EU, these 
national authorities lay down concrete rules on transparency, 
unbundling, pricing and accounting.14 Examples of the 
competition law approach are the directive deregulating the 
terminal equipment market adopted in 1988,15 as well as 
directives to open up the markets for value-added services 
(1990),16 data services (1990),17 satellite communications 
(1994)18 and mobile communication (1996).19  At an EU 
Telecom Review in 1993, agreement was achieved to fully lib-
eralize the telecom markets by January 1, 1998, including voice 
  
and Equipment, COM(87)290 final [hereinafter Green Paper on Develop-
ment]. 
 9. Id. at 184-85. 
 10. Id. at 189. 
 11. This point has been well made by Herbert Ungerer, Access Issues Un-
der EU Regulation and Antitrust Law: The Case of Telecommunications and 
Internet Markets at 12 n.10 (Program on Information Resources Policy), at 
http://pirp.harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/ungerer/ungerer-i00-3.pdf (July 2000).  
 12. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY , Nov. 10, 1997, art. 
82, O.J. (C 340) 3, 209 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. 
 13. See Green Paper on Development, supra note 8. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Commission Directive 88/301 on Competition in the Markets in 
Telecommunications Terminal Equipment, 1988 O.J. (L 131) 73. 
 16. See Commission Directive 90/388 on Competition in the Markets for 
Telecommunications Services, art. 2, 1990 O.J. (L 192) 10, 15. 
 17. See id. art. 3.    
 18. See Commission Directive 94/46 Amending Directive 88/301 and Di-
rective 90/388, in Particular with Regard to Satellite Communications, 1994 
O.J. (L 268) 15.  
 19. See Commission Directive 96/2 Amending Directive 90/388 with Re-
gard to Mobile and Personal Communications, 1996 O.J. (L 20) 59. 
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January 1, 1998, including voice telephony.20 This agreement 
was implemented in 1996.21  At the same time, the ONP con-
cept was advanced through a framework directive,22 which was 
followed by issue and sector-specific directives,23 especially on 
interconnection24 and recommendations.25 Later, the ONP con-
  
 20. See Communication to the Council and European Parliament on the 
Consultation on the Review of the Situation in the Telecommunications Ser-
vices Sector, COM(93)159 final at 35. 
 21. See Commission Directive 96/19 Amending Commission Directive 
90/388 with Regard to the Implementation of Full Competition in Telecom-
munications Markets, 1996 O.J. (L 74) 13.  
 22. See Council Directive 90/387 on the Establishment of the Internal 
Market for Telecommunications Services Through the Implementation of 
Open Network Provision, 1990 O.J. (L 192) 1 [hereinafter ONP Framework 
Directive].  
 23. See Council Directive 92/44 on the Application of Open Network Provi-
sion to Leased Lines, 1992 O.J. (L 165) 27; Parliament and Council Directive 
95/62 on the Application of Open Network Provision (ONP) to Voice Teleph-
ony, 1995 O.J. (L 321) 6; Parliament and Council Directive 98/10 on the Ap-
plication of Open Network Provision (ONP) to Voice Telephony and on Uni-
versal Service for Telecommunications in a Competitive Environment, 1998 
O.J. (L 101) 24; Parliament and Council Directive 97/66 Concerning the Proc-
essing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Telecommunica-
tions Sector, 1998 O.J. (L 24) 1 [hereinafter Parliament and Council Directive 
97/66]. 
 24. Specifically on interconnection, see Parliament and Council Directive 
97/33 on Interconnection in Telecommunications with Regard to Ensuring 
Universal Service and Interoperability Through Application of the Principles 
of Open Network Provision (ONP), 1997 O.J. (L 199) 32 [hereinafter Parlia-
ment and Council Directive 97/33], amended by Parliament and Council 
Directive 98/61 with Regard to Operator Number Portability and Carrier Pre-
selection, 1998 O.J. (L 268) 37. 
 25. See, e.g., Council Recommendation 92/382 on the Harmonized Provi-
sion of a Minimum Set of Packet-Switched Data Services (PSDS) in Accor-
dance with Open Network Provision (ONP) Principles, 1992 O.J. (L 200) 1; 
Council Recommendation 92/383 on the Provision of Harmonized Integrated 
Services Digital Network (ISDN) Access Arrangements and a Minimum Set 
of ISDN Offerings in Accordance with Open Network Provision (ONP) Princi-
ples, 1992 O.J. (L 200) 10; Commission Recommendation 98/322 on Intercon-
nection in a Liberalised Telecommunications Market, 1998 O.J. (L 141) 6; 
Commission Recommendation 98/511 Amending Recommendation 98/195 on 
Interconnection in a Liberalised Telecommunications Market (Part I — Inter-
connection Pricing), 1998 O.J. (L 228) 30. 
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cept was substantially revised to take into account the chang-
ing shape of the competitive telecom market.26 
Directives are not directly applicable legal rules. Rather, 
they oblige Member States to transpose their substance into 
national law within a time period specified in the directive.27 In 
addition to this two-level implementation structure, there is 
also a track-specific adjudication structure: Competition direc-
tives are adjudicated by the legal system and ultimately de-
cided by the ECJ. On the other hand, ONP directives, once 
transposed into national laws of Member States, are applied 
and used by national regulatory authorities to create and en-
force ex-ante provisions.28 
The European (de)regulatory history is therefore substan-
tially different from that in the U.S. In the U.S., Congress de-
cided to grant the American Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany  (“AT&T”) first a temporary, later a permanent monopoly 
over almost all aspects of telecommunications.29 For decades, 
AT&T was the dominant provider of both telecom services and 
equipment. By 1970, modest competition had been introduced 
in the telecom equipment market, and — with the advent of 
microwave transmission — long-distance services.30 
In 1974, the U.S. Department of Justice charged AT&T with 
violations of sections 2 and 4 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.31 
In 1984, the decade long anti-trust struggle was finally settled 
with the so-called Modification of Final Judgement (“MFJ”),32 
which ordered the break-up of AT&T.33 The company was al-
lowed to provide long-distance telecommunication services, but 
it had to divest its local exchanges into seven Regional Bell Op-
  
 26. Parliament and Council Directive 97/51 Amending Council Di rective 
90/387 and 92/44 for the Purpose of Adaptation to a Competitive Environ-
ment in Telecommunications, 1997 O.J. (L 295) 23. 
 27. See EC TREATY, supra note 12, art. 249. 
 28. See Ungerer, supra note 11, at 17. 
 29. See Jim Chen, The Legal Process and Political Economy of Telecom-
munications Reform, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 835, 838-39 (1997). 
 30. Id. at 843-50. 
 31. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 427 F. Supp. 57, 58 
(D.D.C. 1976). 
 32. See United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 
(D.D.C. 1982), aff’d sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 
(1983). 
 33. See ROBERT W. CRANDALL, AFTER THE BREAKUP: U.S. 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN A MORE COMPETITIVE ERA 41 (1991). 
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erating Companies (“RBOCs”),34 which in turn were prohibited 
from providing long-distance services and manufacturing ter-
minal equipment.35 
In 1996, Congress ventured into a second phase of liberaliza-
tion with the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“1996 Act”).36 
The 1996 Act abolishes the RBOCs’ public utilities status and 
revokes their exclusive franchises under state law.37 Attempt-
ing to facilitate the entry of new competitors, the 1996 Act 
mandates interconnection and forces the former RBOCs to pro-
vide unbundled network access and collocation.38 RBOCs were 
permitted to compete in long-distance markets, as long as com-
petition was introduced in their local markets.39 Similarly, 
AT&T was permitted to enter the local exchange markets, and 
has done so through its AT&T Broadband subsidiary.40 
Institutionally, the Communications Act of 1934 gave the 
Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) the power to 
regulate long-distance services and terminal equipment, while 
giving the states the power to regulate the local exchange as a 
public utility.41 States then granted their local carriers (mostly 
AT&T branches) exclusive franchises.42 The 1996 Act federal-
ized much of U.S. telecommunications law, favoring the FCC as 
a regulatory authority by expressly empowering it to imple-
ment the Act’s local competition provisions.43 At the same time, 
  
 34. At that time, the seven RBOCs were: American Information Technolo-
gies Corporation, Bell Atlantic Corporation, Bell South Corporation, Nynex 
Corporation, Pacific Telesis Group, Southwestern Bell Corporation and US 
West.  Id. at 10. 
 35. See id. at 37. 
 36. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
 37. See Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 253(a) (Supp. III 
1998) [hereinafter 1996 Act]. 
 38. See id. §§ 251(a)-(c), 252. 
 39. See id. § 271. 
 40. See AT&T Grows Larger, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1999, at A32. 
 41. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-612 (1994). 
 42. The local exchange, even more so than the telecom infrastructure at 
large, was seen as a typical “natural monopoly.”  Daniel F. Spulber, Deregu-
lating Telecommunications, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 25, 31 (1995). 
 43. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 377-78 (1999).  The 
Court stated: 
 
Section 201(b), a 1938 amendment to the Communications Act of 
1934, provides that “[t]he Commission may prescribe such rules and 
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Congress severely curtailed the FCC’s decisional discretion in 
this matter through the highly detailed clauses in the 1996 
Act.44 In the areas in which the FCC continued to enjoy deci-
sional discretion, implementation of its decision was stalled 
through legal action, and only partly resolved by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board, which 
reaffirmed the FCC’s extended jurisdiction. 45 
III. THREE MODES OF REGULATORY INTERDEPENDENCE 
In a simple model, rule making is purely a response to do-
mestic demands for regulation, combined with a capacity and 
willingness of the state to provide regulation.  However, in 
practice, regulatory rule making is part of a larger process of 
competition, coordination and learning among states.  As 
economies have become increasingly intertwined, these inter-
dependencies have increased dramatically.  The most often dis-
cussed interdependence are so-called “races to the bottom,” but 
the interdependence of regulations is much more complex than 
a simple spiral into the ground. Below, the Article discusses 
three modes of cross-jurisdictional regulatory interdependence, 
which are labeled competitive, coordinative and informational. 
A. Competitive Interdependence 
In many ways, jurisdictions are in competition with each 
other, and the regulatory system is one tool among many where 
states seek a competitive edge through a distinctive regulatory 
system. There are two reasons why jurisdictions might seek to 
be distinctive: (1) to gain a competitive advantage over other 
jurisdictions; or (2) to block competition in the domestic market 
through non-tariff barriers.  
An example of the first case is where one jurisdiction may of-
fer lower tax rates or subsidies to attract capital.  If multiple 
  
regulations as may be necessary in the public interest to carry out 
the provisions of this Act.”  Since Congress expressly directed that 
the 1996 Act, along with its local-competition provisions, be inserted 
into the Communications Act of 1934, 1996 Act § 1(b), 110 Stat. 56, 
the Commission’s rulemaking authority would seem to extend to im-
plementation of the local-competition provisions. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 44. See 1996 Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-261, 271-276 (Supp. III 1998). 
 45. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 366. 
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jurisdictions are seeking to be distinctive in this manner, there 
is likely to be a ratcheting effect with respect to what is distinc-
tive, where what offers a competitive advantage today may 
simply be average tomorrow.  What may result is a race to the 
bottom where all jurisdictions would prefer more stringent 
rules, but choose lax ones so as not to fall at a competitive dis-
advantage.  This is the so-called “Delaware effect,”46 where it 
has been argued that the state became the preferred home of 
corporations in the U.S. because it has a lax regulatory re-
gime.47 In this scenario, jurisdictional competition may limit 
the capacity of a jurisdiction to implement redistributional 
policies, if those who would lose wealth are mobile. The danger 
of an imminent race to the bottom has also been described in 
the area of privacy legislation in Europe, including telecommu-
nication privacy, arguably necessitating EU action.48 It is im-
portant to note that in the regulatory area where there has 
been the most research — environmental regulation — there 
are few studies that support the conclusion that race to the bot-
tom dynamics happen.49  The second case where states select 
distinctive standards is where they choose them so as to protect 
domestic manufacturers.  The regulation of terminal equip-
ment markets in Europe before liberalization offers excellent 
examples: standards were designed to favor domestic manufac-
turers, resulting in a protected domestic market.50   
These two cases of “competition” are, in substance, quite dif-
ferent, but both potentially have a prisoner’s dilemma struc-
ture of payoffs, where cooperation leads to a better outcome for 
  
 46. DAVID VOGEL, TRADING UP: CONSUMER AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
REGULATION IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY 5-6 (1995) [hereinafter TRADING UP].  
 47. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 663  (1974). 
 48. See Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Operator, Please Give Me Information: 
The European Union Directive on Data Protection in Telecommunications, in 
COMPETITION, REGULATION, AND CONVERGENCE : CURRENT TRENDS IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH 121, 123-25 (Sharon Eisner Gillett & 
Ingo Vogelsang eds., 1999). 
 49. See Robert E. Hudec, Introduction to the Legal Studies, in 2 FAIR 
TRADE AND HARMONIZATION:  PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 1, 1-2 (Jagdish 
Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996). 
 50. See generally Marc T. Austin & Helen V. Milner, Strategies of Euro-
pean Standardization, 8 J. EUR. PUB. POL ’Y 411 (2001).   
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both parties than non-cooperation.51 As has been analyzed ex-
tensively elsewhere, the prisoner’s dilemma may resolve itself 
under particular circumstances, notably: (1) where there is a 
long future of potential cooperation at stake (as compared to a 
one-time transaction); 52 and (2) where there is a small number 
of actors.53  The smaller the future stakes and the larger the 
number of actors involved, the more difficult it is for actors to 
resolve the dilemma without resorting to a higher authority.  
Thus, under these circumstances, it may be beneficial for a cen-
tral authority to step in and limit the range of policies that a 
jurisdiction may choose.  
Not all jurisdictional competition, of course, is bad.  And it is 
not desirable for all prisoner’s dilemmas to be resolved through 
mutual cooperation.  In fact, in the literal prisoner’s dilemma 
scenario (two prisoners facing the choice of whether to turn in 
their co-conspirator), it is societally undesirable for the prison-
ers to cooperate with each other.  There is a similar concern 
about cooperation among jurisdictions.  To the extent that gov-
ernments seek objectives other than the welfare of their citi-
zens, competition among jurisdictions might limit their capac-
ity to do so.54 For example, there has been a powerful revision-
ist interpretation of the Delaware effect that Delaware does not 
have a more relaxed regulatory environment.55  In fact (the ar-
gument goes) such a regime would be counterproductive be-
  
 51. Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, International “Standards” and 
International Governance, 8 J. EUR. PUB. POL ’Y 345, 347-48 (2001);  David 
Lazer, Regulatory Interdependence and International Governance, 8 J. EUR. 
PUB. POL’Y 474, 476 (2001) [hereinafter Regulatory Interdependence].  
 52. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 
(1984); COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY (Kenneth A. Oye ed., 1986).  
 53. See Duncan Snidal, Coordination Versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implica-
tions for International Cooperation and Regimes, 79 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 923, 
936-37 (1985). 
 54. In fact, much of the public choice literature is based on such an as-
sumption regarding government behavior.  See, e.g., Geoffrey Brennan & 
James M. Buchanan, Towards a Tax Constitution for Leviathan, 8 J. PUB. 
ECON . 255, 271-72 (1977); WILLIAM NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971).  For a more recent example, see 
ANDREI SHLEIFER & ROBERT W. V ISHNY, THE GRABBING HAND : GOVERNMENT 
PATHOLOGIES AND THEIR CURES (1998). 
 55. See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethink-
ing the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1210 (1992).  
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cause investors would not invest in companies if there were not 
an effective regulatory regime. 56  Instead, what Delaware of-
fers is efficient government — one that moves quickly and pre-
dictably.  In essence, Delaware finds an “optimal” balance be-
tween protecting shareholders rights and minimizing burdens 
on corporations.57  
In this scenario, competition may reduce the room that gov-
ernments have to maneuver, but at the benefit of the gov-
erned.58  Ironically, the role of any central authority would 
therefore be to foster a prisoner’s dilemma among its constitu-
ent units. For example, it should not limit policy options of in-
dividual jurisdictions, and attempt to eliminate collusion 
among jurisdictions. 
The EU’s mandate to create independent national regulatory 
authorities (“NRAs”) for the telecom sector provides a good ex-
ample.59 Previously, national regulatory power rested mostly 
with the telecom ministries, which typically had long and close 
ties with the incumbent telecom monopolist and with politi-
cians in power.60 This institutional set up likely encouraged 
deals to support the national incumbent and coordination 
among similarly situated ministerial regulators in other coun-
tries to maximize political slack.  Forcing Member States to set 
up independent NRAs disrupted this close linkage and limited 
the potential for collusion. 
B. Coordinative Interdependence 
Coordination is an issue when there are benefits to all to 
having a uniform standard.  This most obviously is the case 
where a technological interface comes into play. Who does not 
recall the problem of plugging in an electrical device manufac-
tured in a different country? The world’s three different televi-
  
 56. Id. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, 
Tax Setting, and Yardstick Competition, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 25, 34-36 (1995).   
 59. The ONP interconnection directive, among other documents, defines 
this in detail.  See Parliament and Council Directive 97/33, supra note 24, 
art. 9.  
 60. See Carl B. Kress, The 1996 Telekommunikationsgesetz and the Tele-
communications Act of 1996: Toward More Competitive Markets in Telecom-
munications in Germany and the United States, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 551, 558 
(1997).   
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sion standards — National Television Standards Committee in 
North America, Phased Alternation by Line in Europe and Se-
quential Color with Memory in France and Russia, among oth-
ers — are another example.61 This is also the case for health 
and safety standards where incompatible standards increase 
the costs of exporting — e.g., with agricultural goods.62   
In such an area, the need for conformity will be driven by: (1) 
the technological and societal needs to interface;  (2) the cost of 
producing products compatible with multiple standards; and 
(3) the cost of producing multiple lines of products to different 
standards.63  For example, before the advent of laptop com-
puters connecting to the Internet, having an international 
standard for phone plugs was not an issue, as one would almost 
never take one’s phone on an international trip. Only with the 
rise of the Internet and mobile computing came the technologi-
cal (and market) need for conformity. On the other hand, if the 
cost of producing products compatible with multiple standards 
is low, incentives for conformity are low, too. The power sup-
plies in today’s mobile phones, laptops and even desktop com-
puters for instance, automatically switch between 110 and 220 
volts, therefore reducing the pressure to create a uniform 
global electricity standard.64  
However, if the production of multiple lines of products to 
different standards is very costly, the benefits of a widely held 
standard will be high.  Again the European phone equipment 
market provides a case in point. While the transmission stan-
dards have been harmonized, the pressure for conformity was 
strong because of interface concerns, as many EU Member 
States still have millions of legacy phone plugs that comply 
with earlier national standards.65 Equipment manufacturers 
have responded by producing one line of phones, with a stan-
dard (American) plug. Each phone is then “customized” to the 
target market by adding the right cord with the appropriate 
plug. This strategy substantially lowers the cost of maintaining 
  
 61. See Austin & Milner, supra note 50, at 428 nn.12-14. 
 62. See David Vogel, Trading Up and Governing Across: Transnational 
Governance and Environmental Protection, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 556, 563-64 
(1997) [hereinafter Transnational Governance]. 
 63. See Regulatory Interdependence, supra note 51, at 476.  
 64. Id. at 477. 
 65. Id. 
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multiple production lines.66 On the other hand, there will be 
little need for a single standard even in case there is a need to 
interface, if it is cheap to manufacture products that are com-
patible.  
The phone plug example also highlights the importance of 
switching costs .67  Obviously, producers and consumers invest 
in a particular standard. Consequently, a shift to another stan-
dard will involve a loss of useful assets.  The gains of harmoni-
zation therefore must be weighed against the loss of these as-
sets.  Thus, for example, it probably does not make sense for 
the U.K. to switch the side of the street its cars drive on, even 
though there would some interface and economies of scale 
benefits to having compatible cars with the continent. 
The selection of a frequency band for third generation mobile 
phones (often called “3G” or “UMTS”) provides another exam-
ple. As a result of international negotiations, dozens of nations 
around the world agreed to use a particular frequency band for 
3G mobile devices.68 This will permit these devices to be used 
internationally, hence — at least this is the hope — stimulate 
their use by providing a seamless experience for the custom-
ers.69 The U.S. has chosen a different frequency band. This is in 
part because the U.S., due to its size, has relatively less need 
for interface with other countries than most states do.  It was 
also driven by concerns about switching costs: the frequency 
band selected by the rest of the world is used heavily in the 
  
 66. The “Euro Plug,” a standard European phone plug, will ultimately 
eliminate the necessity for multiple lines altogether.  See Commission Deci-
sion 97/486 on a Common Technical Regulation for the General Attachment 
Requirements for Terminal Equipment to Interface to Open Network Provi-
sion (ONP) Two-Wire Analogue Leased Lines, 1997 O.J. (L 208) 44.  Euro-
pean Standard ETS 300 012 harmonizes the plug for digital phones.  Har-
monization of the analogue phone plugs (the Euro Plug) is outlined and envi-
sioned based on the Commission Directive 97/486 by EUROPEAN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS STANDARDS INST., TERMINAL EQUIPMENT (TE):  
TECHNICAL FEASIBILITY OF A HARMONI ZED PLUG AND SOCKET STANDARD FOR 
EUROPEAN PUBLIC SWITCHED TELEPHONE NETWORK (PSTN) ACCESS, DTR/ATA-
005037 (1997), available at http://www.etsi.org/getastandar/ home.htm > “free 
download” > “publications” > “ETR 344.” 
 67. See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES:  A STRATEGIC 
GUIDE TO THE NETWORK ECONOMY 103-04 (1999). 
 68. MOBILE LIFESTREAMS, “YES 2 3G” — WHITE PAPER 13 (2001), available 
at http://www.gsmworld.com/presentations/white_papers/yes23g.pdf.   
 69. Id. 
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U.S. by the military.70 Replacing the existing military standard 
and infrastructure would be more costly than the benefits 
reaped from fully interoperable mobile devices.  
The possibility of switching costs also highlights a timing is-
sue with respect to resolving coordination challenges.  At some 
point, as jurisdictions invest in a particular standard, it will 
not make sense to switch to competing standards, even if there 
are major benefits to compatibility.71  Thus, where there is sub-
stantial potential for switching costs, there are particular bene-
fits to early collective intervention. 
The development of the Groupe Special Mobile (“GSM”) 
standard for digital cellular mobile telecommunications in 
Europe offers a telling example, where the EU acted early to 
encourage the development of a Europe-wide digital standard.72  
In the absence of centralized intervention, it is plausible that 
Europe might have balkanized around competing standards, 
leading to interface problems and higher unit costs — as, in-
deed, has occurred in the U.S.73 
In a world with a dominant actor, coordination challenges 
will generally resolve themselves efficiently, although perhaps 
not equitably.74  Jurisdictions will evaluate their choices in 
light of what the dominant actor has chosen, and if the benefits 
of conformity with that dominant standard are high enough, 
they will choose that standard.  The decision of a small juris-
diction to conform to the standard of the dominant jurisdiction 
will generate a small benefit for the dominant jurisdiction and 
potentially a much larger benefit (at least per capita) for the 
small jurisdiction. 
  
 70. See Elisa Batista, U.S. 3G Spectrum Price-tag Soars, WIRED (June 13, 
2001), at http://www.wired.com/news/wireless/0,1382,44468,00.html. 
 71. See Stanley M. Besen & Joseph Farrell, Choosing How to Compete: 
Strategies and Tactics in Standardization, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 117, 129 (1994). 
 72. See Jacques Pelkmans, The GSM Standard: Explaining a Success 
Story, 8 J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 432, 433 (2001).  For a general overview of the 
GSM standard, see generally MICHEL MOULY & MARIE-BERNADETTE PAUTET, 
THE GSM SYSTEM FOR MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS (1992); SIEGMUND H. REDL, 
AN INTRODUCTION TO GSM (1995).  
 73. See Pelkmans, supra note 72, at 433. 
 74. In game theory terms, this type of strategic interdependence is called 
“battle of the sexes.”  See, e.g., ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION :  AN 
INTRODUCTION TO GAME THEORY 31 (1989). 
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Thus, many nations have chosen to follow the GSM stan-
dard.75  While this choice generates some positive externalities 
for the EU (through greater international interoperability, and 
slightly lower per unit costs), most of the benefits are accrued 
by adopters (as compared to a counterfactual world where 
small states created their own standards).  For example, for a 
small country like Israel, development of its own standard 
would result in exorbitant unit prices, in addition to loss of in-
teroperability.  Adoption of EU standards results in far cheaper 
handsets, as well as interoperability in Europe.  While Israeli 
adoption of GSM generates some benefits for Europe (since 
they potentially gain the benefits of interoperability when they 
visit Israel, as well as (tiny) reductions in per-unit costs), Is-
raeli benefits are far greater.  
There are two distributional concerns with respect to coordi-
nation, combined with decentralized governance and a concen-
tration of power.  First, where there are significant benefits to 
convergence, the dominant actor will almost always get its pre-
ferred policy outcome.76 Second, where regulation may be ar-
rayed along a spectrum of least to most strict, and it is costly to 
produce multiple versions of a particular good, there will be a 
bias toward adopting the strictest standards — so that the 
product may have access to all markets.  That is, there may be 
a race toward the top, as evidenced by the spread of strict pes-
ticides and auto emissions regulations.77 The auto emissions 
regulations case is a telling one, where California adopted 
emissions standards that exceeded federal standards.78  These 
Californian standards have become de facto national stan-
dards, because it was not efficient for manufacturers to produce 
multiple versions of their products.79  As a result, the costs of 
California’s standards are borne in part (mostly) by other ju-
  
 75. GSM accounts for 75% of the world’s digital market and 71% of the 
world’s wireless market.  The number of countries/areas with GSM System is 
178 and total subscribers are 677 million by March 2002.  See Press Release, 
GSM World News, GSM Association Welcomes 122 New Member Companies 
At 47th Plenary Meeting (Apr. 17, 2002), available at 
http://www.gsmworld.com/news/press_2002/press_12_p147.shtml. 
 76. See Charles P. Kindleberger, Standards as Public, Collective and Pri-
vate Goods, 36 KYKLOS 377, 393 (1983). 
 77. See TRADING UP, supra note 46, at 6, 250.  
 78. Transnational Governance, supra note 62, at 561. 
 79. Id. at 561-62. 
 4/19/02 6:09:53 PM 
834 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. XXVII:3 
risdictions, including some that place little or no value on emis-
sions reduction. 
In a world where power is more diffuse, coordination will be 
more difficult to achieve without some centralized intervention.  
As for the benefits to justify the costs of adopting a new stan-
dard, a critical mass of jurisdictions must already adhere to 
that standard.80  A dominant actor (by assumption) provides 
that critical mass.  In the absence of a dominant actor, it may 
require multiple actors to provide that critical mass — the 
more diffuse power is, the more actors will be required.81  In 
the absence of centralized institutions to facilitate bargaining, 
conflicts over the distributional implications of different stan-
dards may preclude a common standard.82 
A simple example will illustrate the challenge. Let us imag-
ine there are ten states each with their own widget standard.  
As there are major economies of scale to producing widgets, 
some manufacturers have multiple product lines to sell to mul-
tiple markets (at higher per unit costs), while some manufac-
turers produce only for their home market.  Consumers pay 
higher prices because manufacturers’ costs are higher, and be-
cause there is less competition in each market.  Each state 
faces the choice of adopting another state’s standard.  This 
would have the benefit of increasing the scale of production for 
goods produced to that standard.  It would, however, have the 
cost of stranding many of the assets (presumably dispropor-
tionately in the home state) devoted uniquely to producing to 
that state’s standard.  If these costs are extremely high, or the 
benefits to cheaper production costs and greater competition 
are small, then it may not make sense for all ten states to har-
monize, since the costs may exceed the benefits.  However, of-
ten there will be a wide range of benefits and costs where it 
would not make sense for a pair of states to harmonize, but it 
  
 80. See Nicholas Economides & Charles Himmelberg, Critical Mass and 
Network Evolution in Telecommunications, in TOWARD A COMPETITIVE 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: SELECTED PAPERS FROM THE 1994 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH CONFERENCE  47 (Gerard W. Brock 
ed., 1995); Brian W. Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, 
and Lock-In by Historical Events, 99 ECON. J. 116, 127 (1989). 
 81.  See Kindleberger, supra note 76, at 393. 
 82. Besen & Farrell, supra note 71, at 121. 
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would make sense for the entire set of states to agree to a sin-
gle standard.   
Philipp Genschel and Thomas Plümper provide an example 
in the banking arena, where prior to 1987, there was no effec-
tive global standard with respect to accounting standards for 
banks.83  In 1987, with the Basle Accord, the U.S., the U.K. and 
Japan effectively imposed a global standard on the rest of the 
world.84  They were successful in doing so because once a criti-
cal mass (provided by those three countries) adopted a stan-
dard, banks from non-compliant countries would be placed at a 
competitive disadvantage internationally.  The rest of the 
world quickly fell in line behind the standard.85 
The value of centralized governance when there are coordi-
nation concerns is therefore threefold.  First, it limits the ca-
pacity of a large jurisdiction to unilaterally create de facto in-
ternational standards.  Second, it limits the ability of stricter 
jurisdictions to transfer the costs of strict standards to other 
jurisdictions.  Third, it provides a mechanism to provide the 
public good of a common standard. 
Information is at the foundation of coordination challenges.  
In the absence of information and communication, coordination 
is impossible.  As a result, associated with coordination chal-
lenges are a variety of mechanisms to transmit data on what 
other states are doing.  Effective transmission of information 
will help resolve coordination challenges even in the absence of 
centralized governance mechanisms, as jurisdictions adapt to 
what other states are doing.  However, even in the absence of 
the incentives to conform discussed above, the transmission of 
information has an independent effect on policy making, be-
cause that information will also convey lessons as to what are 
good and what are bad policies, which is the focus of the “in-
formational” mode of regulatory interdependence.86 
  
 83. See Philipp Genschel & Thomas Plümper, Regulatory Competition and 
International Co-Operation, 4 J. EUR. PUB. POL ’Y 626, 628 (1997). 
 84. Id. at 629-30. 
 85. Id. at 630. 
 86. See Regulatory Interdependence, supra note 51, at 480-81. 
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C. Informational 
The principle of the informational mode is simple: Even if 
policies among jurisdictions are not interdependent in the 
sense that jurisdiction A’s choice affects the payoffs to jurisdic-
tion B, A’s choice may affect the information that B has about 
its choices.87  For example, A may generate information about 
policy alternatives simply in determining its own choice.  This 
information may then be recycled by other jurisdictions.  Even 
if A does not generate information about success and failure, 
the decision by A to select policy alternative X rather than pol-
icy alternative Y sends a signal to other jurisdictions that al-
ternative X is better than alternative Y.  Thus, for example, the 
Scandinavian NTM-450 analog standard in mobile telephony, 
with roaming throughout Scandinavia, served effectively (and 
accidentally) as a model for the GSM standard, with roaming 
throughout the EU.88  
There are four concerns with respect to informational inter-
dependence: (1) that information spreads as efficiently as pos-
sible; (2) that enough information be produced; (3) that the 
spread of information does not squelch heterogeneity in the 
system; and (4) that fads will be minimized.89 
1. Efficient Information Diffusion 
Communication among jurisdictions is not necessarily struc-
tured so as to facilitate the overall spread of information among 
all jurisdictions.90  Information networks may be characterized 
by a hub and spoke structure, where a few central actors get a 
lot of information, and peripheral actors little.  Alternatively, 
there may be very good communication within small groups of 
jurisdictions, but poor communication between those groups. It 
is therefore possible that jurisdiction A has the answer to ju-
risdiction B’s problems — but jurisdiction B does not know it.91  
  
 87. See David Lazer, How to Maintain Innovation.gov in a Networked 
World?, Paper Presented at the Fourth Annual Visions of Governance for the 
Twenty-First Century Retreat (July 11-14, 1999) (on file with Journal) [here-
inafter Innovation.gov].   
 88. See Pelkmans, supra note 72, at 437. 
 89. See Innovation.gov, supra note 87, at 2. 
 90. See id. at 2-6.  
 91. See id. at 3-5. 
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2. Information Production 
If information flows freely, jurisdictions may underinvest in 
their policy decisions, relying on some other jurisdiction to 
make a decision.  That is, ironically, if information is instantly 
public and easily accessible, then the production of information 
is a public good:  While a jurisdiction might benefit from ex-
perimentation, other jurisdictions may benefit as much, with-
out incurring the costs and risks associated with experimenta-
tion.  A likely result is that jurisdictions will underinvest in 
their own policymaking process, as they wait for other jurisdic-
tions to come up with solutions.92 
3. Preservation of Heterogeneity 
Because of the information generated by experimentation, it 
may be beneficial for there to be a heterogeneity of policy ap-
proaches — even if some of them are “non-optimal” at the time, 
as different approaches may offer better solutions to future 
problems.  A mimetic process by which the less successful imi-
tate the more successful may eliminate (systemically) useful 
heterogeneity.   
4. Prevention of Fads 
If information flows freely, it is as possible that bad policy 
choices will spread as good policy choices.  There is a substan-
tial literature on “information cascades” that demonstrates 
that the contagion process often overwhelms the quality of an 
idea.93  Bad policies may spread almost as easily as good poli-
cies. 
These issues around information diffusion are, of course, not 
new to the information age.  Jared Diamond, in his sweeping 
treatment of all of human (pre)history, for example, argues 
that the structure of information diffusion gave Europe a criti-
  
 92. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection: Does Federal-
ism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980); Koleman S. Strumpf, 
Does Government Decentralization Increase Policy Innovation?, 4 J. PUB. 
ECON . THEORY 207 (2002).  
 93. See Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others: 
Conformity, Fads and Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 151, 154 
(1998). 
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cal advantage over the rest of the world.94  His argument, in 
short, is that Europe, in contrast to the other continents, had a 
geography that was effective at diffusing innovations, but rug-
ged enough to preserve heterogeneity.95 What is new in the in-
formation age has been the progressive decoupling of virtual 
geography from real geography.96  It may be, for example, eas-
ier to send information to the other side of the world than to 
one’s neighbor.  Virtual topography is certainly more malleable 
than the physical, and can be molded in a way that optimizes 
the flow of information. 
Thus, while coordination and competition concerns have re-
ceived the bulk of attention regarding telecommunication regu-
lation, creating a capacity that allows policy makers to effec-
tively build upon prior experience may, over the long run, be 
far more important than competitive and coordinative con-
cerns. 
D. Creating Governance Structures 
The informational, coordinative and competitive modes of 
policy interdependence each pose governance challenges in de-
centralized regulatory systems.  The key question in all of 
these modes is the extent that rule making should be central-
ized.  The critical question is a structural one: Who should have 
responsibility for what pieces of regulatory policy — the central 
government, or the constituent jurisdictions? 
In the foreground of the decision regarding how much to cen-
tralize policy making is the underlying heterogeneity of policy 
preferences of the set of jurisdictions.  Ceteris paribus, the 
greater the heterogeneity, the less central authority should 
intervene.  However, if the disfunctions resulting from policy 
interdependence are high enough, there should be some con-
straints on the policy choices of jurisdictions even in the pres-
ence of great heterogeneity. 
If coordination is the major challenge to the system, then the 
key concerns are to prevent inefficient divergence, and non-
accountable convergence. Inefficient divergence is most likely 
  
 94. See JARED DIAMOND, GUNS, GERMS AND STEEL: THE FATE OF HUMAN 
SOCIETIES 409-10 (1999). 
 95. Id. at 409-17. 
 96. See WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, E-TOPIA: OUR TOWN TOMORROW 4-7 (1999).  
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where market power is diffuse — a multitude of actors making 
an ad hoc agreement unlikely even where the benefits would be 
high.  The benefits to centralized intervention would be maxi-
mized where interface benefits are high, and/or production cost 
savings outweigh (in present value) the value of the stranded 
assets devoted to producing multiple lines of a product (or a 
multi-standard product).  Thus, the EU actions with respect to 
GSM would appear to be an effective use of a central authority 
as interface benefits were high, and switching costs (since there 
were minimal investments in a digital standard already) were 
low. 
Accountability is a concern where the pressure to conform to 
an emerging regulatory framework is so great that there is a 
disconnect between the framework that emerges and the policy 
preferences of most of the population covered by the regulation.  
This is a particular danger where there is a large jurisdiction, 
whose regulatory choices automatically get such a head start 
on alternatives that they tend to become the de facto frame-
work for the entire system.  Accountability points to the need 
for central institutions to effectively include the policy desires 
of all of the members of the system, and to provide mechanisms 
to compensate losers. 
The EU directive on telecom privacy97 and the more general 
EU privacy directive98 provide cases in point. Both were cham-
pioned by Germany, who wanted its stringent national privacy 
laws to be reflected in similarly stringent EU-wide regula-
tions.99 After years of negotiations, consensus on the directives 
were finally reached during Germany’s EU presidency, after 
the German government had expended significant political 
capital in persuading other Member States to agree.   
In the absence of the EU as a forum for bargaining, it might 
well have been that German privacy laws would have become 
the de facto standard in Europe.  However, as in the California 
emissions example, the costs of the standard would have been 
transferred in part to other jurisdictions that did not place such 
a value on privacy.  Instead, Germany was forced to effectively 
  
 97. See Parliament and Council Directive 97/66, supra note 23.  
 98. See Parliament and Council Directive 95/46 on the Protection of Indi-
viduals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free 
Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31.   
 99. See FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 42-43 (1997). 
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compensate other states in the bargaining process.  The EU 
thus creates a hierarchy of accountability for its Member 
States, where the democratically elected governments of Mem-
ber States may be held accountable for the bargains they agree 
to. 
If competition is the major challenge to the system, the role 
of the central government will be to pre-empt harmful competi-
tion, i.e., race to the bottom effects and protection in the guise 
of technical rules, through constraints on the regulatory 
choices of constituent jur isdictions.  At the same time, the cen-
tral government should not constrain healthy jurisdictional 
competition to create a leaner and more effective regulatory 
system. Thus, for example, the EU has determined certain food 
safety standards to which all Member States must abide, since 
there will be a potential incentive for a race to the bottom in 
those markets otherwise.100   
If the interdependence is primarily informational, then the 
role of the center101 is first to subsidize experimentation and 
diversity. This will compensate for the informational external-
ities that experimentation generates. Second, it is to provide 
effective conduits for information. An effective “clearinghouse” 
will both pre-empt states from “reinventing” the wheel that 
some other state has already invented, and will provide data on 
success and failure of policies of other states, so that fads will 
not occur (i.e., a failed policy will not spread if it is known that 
it is a failure; it might if it is not known that it is a failure).102  
Below, the Article examines the governance challenges that the 
EU faces in regulating telecommunications, and considers the 
match between the challenges and the governance structures of 
the EU. 
  
 100. For a discussion with respect to fish inspection, see Regulatory Inter-
dependence, supra note 51, at 482. 
 101. “Center” is to be liberally interpreted in this context, since the coercive 
power of a central government is not necessary to disseminate information.  
Thus, for example, in the U.S. there are numerous voluntary intergovern-
mental associations, like the National Governor’s Association and the Na-
tional District Attorneys’ Association that play this role.  These organiza-
tions, however, do not have the capacity to perform the first function listed 
above. 
 102. See Innovation.gov, supra note 87, at 1. 
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IV. MULTIPLE MODES, MIXED CURES — THE EU TELECOM 
FRAMEWORK 
As has been mentioned previously, the EU’s framework regu-
lating telecommunications combines centralizing and decen-
tralizing strands with institutional mechanisms that deal with 
informational interdependencies. The decentralized tendency is 
most visible in the principle that telecom laws are still national 
laws.103 The centralizing components of the EU framework are 
highlighted in the harmonized ONP framework.104  Finally, the 
numerous meetings of the NRAs and national telecom policy 
makers on an EU-wide level foster exchange of information and 
provide ample signaling opportunities.105 This confirms what 
the authors have asserted on a theoretical level: that no single 
governance model is optimal. Complex regulatory frameworks 
covering many different jurisdictions are, it seems, bound to 
blend together different governance approaches.  
A. “Mutual Recognition”: EU Standards and National Rules 
The deregulation of the telecom terminal equipment market 
provides an illuminating example. When in the 1980’s the EU 
was faced with the difficult task of liberalizing the terminal 
equipment market, every Member State had vastly different 
regulations and standards in place, intended to protect na-
tional manufacturers. New entrants had to design their equip-
ment in accordance with these national standards, then go 
through a long and costly evaluation process before they could 
sell their equipment.106  This extreme example of decentralized 
governance resulted in a failure to efficiently resolve the coor-
dination and competitive interdependencies among these 
states.  All states would have benefited from a degree of uni-
formity in their standards with resultant reductions in produc-
  
 103. See Mayer-Schönberger & Strasser, supra note 2, at 576. 
 104. See Green Paper on Development, supra note 8, at 69-70; ONP 
Framework Directive, supra note 22, art. 3. 
 105. One place for such EU-wide information exchange is through the In-
dependent Regulators Group at http://irgis.icp.pt/site/en/index.asp (last vis-
ited Apr. 22, 2002). 
 106. In numerous nations, not only the sale of non-compliant equipment 
but also its sheer use was prohibited and punishable by fines.  See generally § 
3 Fernmeldegesetz 1993 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBl] 908/1993 (Aus.); FEV 
BGBl 712/1994 (Aus.). 
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tion costs by manufacturers and increased competition in home 
markets. 
There was a clear need for the EU to impose a degree of uni-
formity.  However, its original strategy to achieve uniformity — 
to impose comprehensive EU-wide standards combined with a 
centralized EU evaluation and testing center to certify compli-
ant products — quickly overwhelmed the institution.107  As the 
failure of this approach became apparent, the EU shifted to an 
approach that wove together strands of centralized and decen-
tralized governance.  First, rather than setting a comprehen-
sive set of standards, it only determined a core set of standards 
for interoperability of terminal equipment — resolving the key 
interface concerns.108 Second, through regulation, it forced 
Member States to recognize the approval of equipment of any 
other Member State.109 The standards ensure necessary homo-
geneity, while the mandatory recognition adds possibly benefi-
cial heterogeneity.110 This system creates a competition among 
regulatory systems — a competition arbitrated by consumers, 
who choose products manufactured under the rules of one sys-
tem or another, and producers, who choose one system or an-
other based on cost and anticipated responses of consumers.  In 
short, this approach addresses the coordination challenges due 
to the interface issues inherent in telecommunications equip-
ment, and the prisoner’s dilemma resulting from the effective 
protection of home markets through regulation. 
  
 107. See Kalypso Nicolaidis, Mutual Recognition of Regulatory Regimes: 
Some Lessons and Prospects, Jean Monnet Working Paper 7/97, 
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/97/97-07.rtf (last visited Apr. 21, 
2002). 
 108. For an overview of this principle of mutual recognition (the so-called 
“new approach”), see EUROPEAN COMMISSION, GUIDE TO THE IMPLEMENTATION 
OF DIRECTIVES BASED ON THE NEW APPROACH AND THE GLOBAL AAPPROACH 
(2000), available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/newapproach/ 
legislation/guide/document/1999_1282_en.pdf. 
 109. Id. 
 110. The system was started with Commission Directive 88/301 on Compe-
tition in the Markets in Telecommunications Terminal Equipment, 1988 O.J. 
(L 131) 73.  Today the relevant legislative framework is provided by Parlia-
ment and Council Directive 99/5 on Radio Equipment and Telecommunica-
tions Terminal Equipment and the Mutual Recognition of Their Conformity, 
1999 O.J. (L 91) 10.  
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The setup has proven to be hugely successful.111 Not surpris-
ingly, production consolidated around the standards of a few 
major markets (where the producers were already located). The 
resulting regulatory competition is no longer to create barriers 
that shelter domestic producers — rather, it is to attract and 
retain producers, whose motivation, in turn, will be to attract 
consumers and lower costs.112  Production costs have decreased, 
and competition increased.  In a handful of years, terminal 
equipment prices came down dramatically, yet interconnectiv-
ity has not been compromised.113  The combination of a uniform 
set of core standards and regulatory competition governed by 
mutual recognition is not the only example of the application of 
mixed governance models.  In fact, “governance mixes” can be 
found in the very enactment and enforcement structures of the 
current regulatory framework.114 
  
 111. The terminal equipment market in the EU has reached annual reve-
nues of $30 billion euros in 2000.  See Radio & Telecommunications Terminal 
Equipment:  Introduction to the R&ETTE Directive, at http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/enterprise/rtte/intr.htm (last modified June 4, 2001).  Annual growth 
rates have been 7-11% since liberalization in the late 1980’s.  See EITO, 
Growth in Information Technology and Telecommunications Even Higher 
Than Expected, at http://www.eito.com/PAGES/EITO/ABSTRACT/Def-
abst.htm (Oct. 1998). 
 112. Whether this will result in a race to the bottom is contingent on the 
quality of information regarding the various regulatory systems.  If terminal 
equipment manufactured according to the standards of a particular jurisdic-
tion were perceived as shoddy, then manufacturers would not choose those 
standards.  In short, a race to the bottom in cases like this is contingent on a 
market failure due to information asymmetries. 
 113. One of the authors himself remembers buying an answering machine 
in Austria in 1987 (pre-liberalization). It cost twenty times (!) as much as a 
similar model in the U.S. at that time. Less than five years later, in the wake 
of liberalization, prices had come down to the U.S. level. 
 114. See Abbott & Snidal, supra note 51, at 346 (arguing for the use of gov-
ernance blends — in that context blending together the private-public dimen-
sion as well as the centralized-decentralized dimension). 
 4/19/02 6:09:53 PM 
844 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. XXVII:3 
B. Enactment: Structural Subsidiarity115 — Centralized Goals 
and National Transposition 
The EU has a number of legal instruments to enact its deci-
sions.116 By far its most widely used instrument — the directive 
— is the very embodiment of structurally blending centralized 
and decentralized governance. The directive, a set of rules ad-
dressed to the Member States, has to be transposed into na-
tional laws.117 This permits a certain flexibility, or heterogene-
ity of the means, while maintaining coherence and homogene-
ity of the goals. 
Almost the entire EU telecom regulatory framework is in the 
form of directives, thus permitting “mixed governance.” But 
this does not guarantee an optimal mix in response to a par-
ticular policy challenge. Finding the appropriate level of gener-
ality or specificity is complex, and highly context specific. One 
of the authors has argued before that this structural subsidiar-
ity in the enactment phase provided the foundation for the EU 
to successfully liberalize the telecom sector.118 Enactment, how-
ever, is not the only phase in which “governance mixes” are 
structurally possible.  
C. Enforcement: Dual Track — Community Law and NRAs 
As mentioned before, the EU’s telecom regulatory framework 
has two distinct tracks. One is based on EU competition law, 
the other on harmonization directives clustered around the 
principle of ONP.119 Enforcement of the former rests on the ju-
dicial system and ultimately with the ECJ.120 This provides for 
a strong centralizing dimension as ultimately one European 
  
 115. See David Lazer & Viktor Mayer-Schönberger, Blueprints for Change: 
Devolution and Subsidiarity in the United States and the European Union, in 
THE FEDERAL V ISION 118, 138-141 (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 
2001).  
 116. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 324 (Desmond Dinan ed., 
2000). 
 117. See EC TREATY, supra note 12, art. 249 (“A directive shall be binding, 
as the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is ad-
dressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and 
methods.”). 
 118. Mayer-Schönberger & Strasser, supra note 2, at 583. 
 119. See Ungerer, supra note 11, at 10. 
 120. Id. at 14 n.22. 
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arbiter resolves the conflicts. Enforcement of the ONP direc-
tives is based on national implementation.121 The directives 
foresee NRAs ultimately enforcing the goals of the directive 
through the regulatory frameworks they advance.122 In this 
sense, the forward-looking rules enacted by the NRAs them-
selves set up in accordance with a directive mandate, are en-
forcement of the directives’ broader goals.123 This provides for 
multiple flexibility and thus heterogeneity, creating the possi-
bility of regulatory competition.124  
Furthermore, this governance mix binds the enforcement (or 
implementation) institutions to each other. Courts will closely 
follow the decisions taken by the NRAs, and wrestle with their 
substance when deciding claims stemming from competition 
law, keeping in mind that NRAs have both a wealth of knowl-
edge and experience in the telecom sector and a strong regula-
tory agenda. NRAs, on the other hand, will closely watch court 
decisions, fully understanding that whatever they regulate, it 
may only be temporary if it cannot withstand judicial scrutiny 
based not on national, but EU competition law.  Like the direc-
tive model in the enactment phase, the dual track model does 
not guarantee efficient results. But it provides a structural ba-
sis for governance mixes even in the implementation phase. 
D. Institutionalizing Governance Mixes 
As enumerated above, the EU has a number of powerful tools 
that implicitly include centralizing and decentralizing compo-
nents.  However, the availability of tools does not guarantee 
their balanced and effective use.  The authors argue here that 
the very decision-making structure of the EU embeds and bal-
ances competing preferences for centralization and decentrali-
zation, where the Commission represents the preferences for 
centralization, and the Council the preferences for decentrali-
zation. 
  
 121. Id. at 7 n.10. 
 122. Id. at 17. 
 123. Id. at 15. 
 124. This implies, of course, that Member States do not coordinate among 
themselves to create a harmonized framework, yet one not envisioned by the 
directives. The involvement of national governments in drafting and enacting 
the directive, combined with the strong economic incentives to compete 
makes such an outcome impossible. 
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Institutional involvement in the EU’s rule making depends 
on the matter to be regulated. Yet, in most instances the Coun-
cil, representing the governments of the individual Member 
States, enacts legislation based on proposals from the Commis-
sion — the EU executive — with some involvement by the 
European Parliament.125 This process in itself incorporates in-
stitutions pushing for heterogeneity and flexibility (usually 
represented by the Council) and harmonization (usually ad-
vanced by the Commission).  
The Council can stall progress by refusing to enact proposed 
community legislation, for example, when it is of the impres-
sion that the proposed directive attempts too much coordina-
tion.126 In competition matters, this power of the Council is 
countered by an equally heavy club of the Commission, as it is 
empowered by the EU Treaty to enact directives ensuring com-
petitive markets without the consent of the Council.127 
This leaves the Commission, traditionally more supportive of 
centralized governance, and the Council, tendentiously more 
supportive of decentralized governance, in a double bind. The 
Council can also stall, centralizing a directive, but risks that 
the Commission may enact parts of it under the rubric of its 
competition powers.128 At the same time, the Commission must 
use its competition threat carefully. Clubbing the Council has 
its political price, and the Commission’s power to legislate is 
limited to the small area of competition matters, creating not 
enough of a power base to enact a full (de)regulatory frame-
work. 
During the “hot” phase of negotiating telecom liberalization, 
the Commission repeatedly threatened to enact deregulatory 
directives based on its competition powers, mainly to induce 
the Council to act faster and be bolder in its liberalization 
steps.129 Yet, the Commission has come to terms with the 
Council every time, enacting competition directives in tandem 
  
 125. See EC TREATY, supra note 12, art. 202. 
 126. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 116, at 118-19. 
 127. See generally Case 41/83, Italian Republic v. Commission, 1985 E.C.R. 
873 (1985).  
 128. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 116, at 103, 
118-19. 
 129. See Herbert Burkert, The Post Deregulatory Landscape in Interna-
tional Telecommunications Law: A Unique European Union Approach?, 27 
BROOK. J. INT ’L L. 739, 755-56 (2002). 
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with the Council’s related ONP harmonization directives 
(which in turn were proposed by the Commission).130  The spe-
cific institutional setup within the EU that has granted over-
lapping, yet distinct powers to both the Commission and the 
Council forces rule-makers to more often, more innovatively 
and more effectively use the directive model and the dual track 
model — governance mixing tools the EU’s regulatory structure 
readily provides.  This approach therefore ensures a degree of 
heterogeneity and innovation among the constituent Member 
States of the EU.   
E. Governing Information 
As mentioned above, the NRAs provide for heterogeneity. In 
this sense they may foster regulatory competition. However, 
even if each Member State’s choice did not directly affect the 
payoffs to the choices by other states, each NRA’s regulatory 
setting also provides a test trial for all other NRAs to see what 
works and what does not. But such innovations will only 
spread if information about them is available and institutions 
exist to facilitate the spread of that information. 
The EU-mandated creation of independent and, most impor-
tantly, transparent NRAs has greatly facilitated the flow of in-
formation. Most NRAs post their decisions on their websites 
and make available their regulatory framework.131 NRA watch-
ing organizations across Europe track the latest developments 
and provide additional informational links.132  But the most 
important informational link is provided by the NRAs them-
selves. They meet, not only at trade conferences, but also at 
informal regular meetings to exchange ideas and experi-
  
 130. Id. at 759-60. 
 131. See, e.g., Office of Telecommunications (U.K.), at 
http://www.oftel.gov.uk (last visited Apr. 21, 2002); Autorité de Régulation 
des Télécommunications (France), at http://www.art-telecom.fr (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2002); Reguliecrungsbehoerde für Telekommunikation und Post 
(Germany), at http://www.regtp.de (last visited Apr. 21, 2002). 
 132. For additional informational links, see TotalTelecom, at 
http://www.totaltele.com (last visited Apr. 21, 2002); European Network for 
Communication and Information Perspectives, at http://www.encip.org (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2002); and Information Society Directorate General, at  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/information_society/index_en.htm (last visited 
Apr. 21, 2002). 
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ences.133 They have created an organization — the Independent 
Regulators Group — as a forum for information exchange.134  
This creates a trans-governmental network, in which NRA offi-
cials share their experience and create an entire dimension of 
informational exchange, directly affecting how they will regu-
late in their jurisdictions in the future. 135 
Informational networks are also embedded within the EU 
rule-making process, as it pulls in the relevant career bureau-
crats in the telecom ministries.  While the Member States’ 
Permanent Representatives to the EU formally keep negotia-
tions going, the substantive work on bargaining a directive is 
often done by the very ministerial bureaucrats who later will 
have to transpose the act into national law.136 They, too, form a 
trans-governmental network, and have continuous and intense 
interaction with their Commission counterparts. 
In short, heterogeneity is a key part of the EU regulatory ap-
proach in telecommunications.  This heterogeneity is often 
framed in terms of national sovereignty or (beneficial) regula-
tory competition.137  However, the decision-making structures 
within the EU actually create a network that is highly effective 
at diffusing information.   Heterogeneity results in experimen-
tation, which creates information, which is then utilized 
throughout the EU because of the effective networks.  Ironi-
  
 133. See Independent Regulators Group, at http://irgis.icp.pt/site/en/irg.asp 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2002). 
 134. Id. The self-description of the Independent Regulators Group, drawn 
from its website:   
 
The Independent Regulators Group — IRG — was established in 
1997 as a group of European National Telecommunications Regula-
tory Authorities (NRAs) to share experiences and points of views 
among its members on issues of common interest such as intercon-
nection, prices, universal service, and other important issues relat-
ing to the regulation and development of the European telecommu-
nications market. 
Id. 
 135. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Government Networks: The Heart of the 
Liberal Democratic Order, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 199 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).  
 136. See DESMOND DINAN, EVER CLOSER UNION?: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION  (2d ed. 1999). 
 137. See Mayer-Schönberger & Strasser, supra note 2, at 582. 
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cally, there is a greater Brandeis-type “laboratories of democ-
racy” effect in the EU than there is in the U.S. 138 
F. Comparisons to the U.S. 
If we compare this mix of governance approaches to the 
United States post-1996 Act framework, a striking difference 
emerges.  First, in the U.S., the crescendo of market and compe-
tition rhetoric surrounding the 1996 Act has not translated into 
a governance structure that actively attempts to induce regula-
tory decentralization (and thus some space for regulatory inno-
vation). After decades of demarcated responsibility between the 
centralized FCC (for terminal equipment and long-distance, 
i.e., inter-jurisdictional services) and the state public utility 
commissions (“PUCs”), Congress opted to shift power towards 
the central authority.139 
This centralizing approach is not only in contrast with the 
EU’s emphasis on decentralized rule transposition and decen-
tralized rule implementation, it also is surprising for a nation 
that generally champions the market ideal. The reasons are 
likely multi-faceted. Political support in Congress may have 
played a role. The negative experience with decentralized 
structures in the build-up of the mobile phone network may 
have weighed in. Finally, Congress may have mistrusted the 
PUCs to create and implement competitive structures after 
having overseen and worked with regional incumbents for 
many decades. 
Decentralized rule implementation through NRAs bears 
some risk. NRAs may be more subject to regulatory capture. 
They may be incompetent.140 Even if they are independent and 
competent, they still create regulatory heterogeneity, which 
produces transactional costs for inter-jurisdictional telecom 
providers and thus reduces their efficiency. Not surprisingly, 
  
 138. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
 139. See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 377-78 (1999). 
 140. Note that the U.S. and the EU have vastly different ratios of resources 
relative to their constituent units:  the federal have far more resources than 
individual states; whereas the major states within the EU have far more 
resources than the EU does.  A more decentralized governance approach may 
therefore be a better match given the existing capacities of governing institu-
tions within Europe.   
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even in Europe not all experts favor the NRA structure. In-
stead, some powerful voices point to the U.S., the FCC and the 
1996 Act in arguing for the abolition of the existing decentral-
ized system and for the establishment of a European-wide 
regulatory authority.141  
A centralized regulatory authority, however, creates a bot-
tleneck in the decision-making process.  Whoever wants to stall 
the deregulatory process only needs to stall the centralized au-
thority. When the FCC, newly empowered by the 1996 Act, 
handed down its first important regulatory decision, its oppo-
nents immediately brought the case before court, hoping — 
rightly — that this would effectively delay the implementation 
of any decision for years.142 To be sure, stalling can happen in a 
decentralized system as well, but it is harder to do. In the EU, 
for instance, one would have to fight the decisions of all NRAs 
in all fifteen Member States to achieve the same result.  Nei-
ther approach is perfect. Each one has its own advantages and 
flaws. What is surprising — at least to an extent — is to find a 
more traditional governance mix in the U.S., and a more inno-
vative multi-dimensional mix in the EU.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Often, deregulation is equated with the introduction of mar-
kets in sectors with former monopolies. It is thus tempting for 
law makers to conclude that there should also be a market of 
regulatory structures, permitting competition. In this Article, 
the authors have shown that this is too simple a view. The au-
thors identify three modes of regulatory interdependence: a 
competitive, a coordinative and an informational one. The 
benefits of centralized governance are that it will eliminate 
coordination challenges (interface, creating scale of production, 
accountability), and destructive competition among jurisdic-
  
 141. See William Lehr & Thomas Kiessling, Telecommunication Regulation 
in the United States and Europe: The Case for Centralized Authority, in 
COMPETITION, REGULATION, AND CONVERGENCE : CURRENT TRENDS IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY RESEARCH 105, 112-16 (Sharon Eisner Gillett & 
Ingo Vogelsang eds., 1999); EUROSTRATEGIES/CULLEN INT ’L, FINAL REPORT ON 
THE POSSIBLE ADDED VALUE OF EUROPEAN REGULATORY AUTHORITY FOR 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS (1999), available at http://europa.eu.inte/ISPO/ info-
soc/telecompolicy/en/erafl12-99.pdf.  
 142. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 366. 
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tions (such as race to the bottom effects).  However, centralized 
governance also eliminates much of the possibility of beneficial 
innovation from jurisdictional competition.   An effective gov-
ernance approach thus needs a multi-dimensional approach 
that mixes centralization and decentralization, while creating 
an informational network that leverages the benefits from in-
novation. 
This examination of the EU regulatory framework suggests 
that it may be a good match for the governance challenges it 
faces in the telecommunications area.  In fact, the regulatory 
tools at the disposal (at the enactment and enforcement stages) 
almost require a modulated approach to regulation — dividing 
up responsibility between the EU and Member States.  This 
legal structure is mirrored in the institutional structure of the 
EU, where the Commission represents centralization, and the 
Council decentralization.  Finally, the rule-making process 
within the EU pulls in key decision makers from the Member 
States, which has the incidental (but very important) conse-
quence of creating an effective informational network.  This 
analysis does not render a winner in telecom deregulation, or 
even compare substantive rule of telecom regulatory regimes. 
Instead, the authors have aimed to provide an evaluation 
method for the regulatory structure and its inter-jurisdictional 
interface, and to assist in answering the question why such a 
structure works well in a given context.  
 
